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Abstract
Background
In many European countries, medicines promotion is governed by voluntary codes of prac-
tice administered by the pharmaceutical industry under its own system of self-regulation. In-
volvement of industry organizations in policing promotion has been proposed to deter illicit
conduct, but few detailed studies on self-regulation have been carried out to date. The ob-
jective of this study was to examine the evidence for promotion and self-regulation in the UK
and Sweden, two countries frequently cited as examples of effective self-regulation.
Methods and Findings
We performed a qualitative content analysis of documents outlining the constitutions and
procedures of these two systems. We also gathered data from self-regulatory bodies on
complaints, complainants, and rulings for the period 2004–2012. The qualitative analysis re-
vealed similarities and differences between the countries. For example, self-regulatory bod-
ies in both countries are required to actively monitor promotional items and impose
sanctions on violating companies, but the range of sanctions is greater in the UK where
companies may, for instance, be audited or publicly reprimanded. In total, Swedish and UK
bodies ruled that 536 and 597 cases, respectively, were in breach, equating to an average
of more than one case/week for each country. In Sweden, 430 (47%) complaints resulted
from active monitoring, compared with only two complaints (0.2%) in the UK. In both coun-
tries, a majority of violations concerned misleading promotion. Charges incurred on compa-
nies averaged €447,000 and €765,000 per year in Sweden and the UK, respectively,
equivalent to about 0.014% and 0.0051% of annual sales revenues, respectively. One hun-
dred cases in the UK (17% of total cases in breach) and 101 (19%) in Sweden were
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highlighted as particularly serious. A total of 46 companies were ruled in breach of code for
a serious offence at least once in the two countries combined (n = 36 in the UK; n = 27 in
Sweden); seven companies were in serious violation more than ten times each. A qualita-
tive content analysis of serious violations pertaining to diabetes drugs (UK, n = 15; Sweden,
n = 6; 10% of serious violations) and urologics (UK, n = 6; Sweden, n = 13; 9%) revealed
various types of violations: misleading claims (n = 23; 58%); failure to comply with undertak-
ings (n = 9; 23%); pre-licensing (n = 7; 18%) or off-label promotion (n = 2; 5%); and promo-
tion of prescription drugs to the public (n = 6; 15%). Violations that go undetected or
unpunished by self-regulatory bodies are the main limitation of this study, since they are
likely to lead to an underestimate of industry misconduct.
Conclusions
The prevalence and severity of breaches testifies to a discrepancy between the ethical stan-
dard codified in industry Codes of Conduct and the actual conduct of the industry. We dis-
cuss regulatory reforms that may improve the quality of medicines information, such as pre-
vetting and intensified active monitoring of promotion, along with larger fines, and giving
greater publicity to rulings. But despite the importance of improving regulatory arrange-
ments in an attempt to ensure unbiased medicines information, such efforts alone are insuf-
ficient because simply improving oversight and increasing penalties fail to address
additional layers of industry bias.
Introduction
A string of whistleblower cases in the United States over the past decade has spotlighted the il-
licit marketing practices of pharmaceutical companies [1,2]. However, in stark contrast to the
US, Europe has had few high-profile cases [3]. This invites the question whether illicit market-
ing is uncommon in Europe, or whether other factors may account for this disparity, such as
lack of monetary incentives for whistleblowers, or other aspects of the European legal and regu-
latory framework. Indeed, it has been suggested that industry may refrain from illicit marketing
in Europe because in many countries industry is highly involved in policing marketing claims,
which is purported to provide the industry with incentive to comply with rules [4,5]. Thus, in
many European countries promotion is governed by a voluntary code of practice administered
by the industry’s own system of self-regulation [5–8]. Such an arrangement differs from the US
—and some European countries, e.g., France [5]—where regulatory agencies such as the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) directly regulate promotion [9].
Against this background, the present paper analyzes industry self-regulation and medicines
promotion in two European countries, the United Kingdom and Sweden, both of which have
been lauded as good examples of self-regulation by industry [5,10] and regulators [11,12]. The
regulatory arrangements in these countries can best be described as “delegated” self-regulation
as an integral part of a co-regulatory scheme involving industry and national medicines regula-
tory authorities [13]. That is, the medicines regulatory authorities have delegated a significant
part of their defined statutory responsibility to the industry trade groups in order to ensure
that promotion complies with European Union (EU) and national medicines law.
In the UK and Sweden the rules on medicines promotion are codified in the national indus-
try trade groups’ Code of Practice [14,15]. The Association of the British Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical Industry Self-Regulation of Drug Promotion
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Industry (ABPI) first established the UK Code in 1958. Läkemedelsindustriföreningen (LIF),
Sweden’s counterpart of the ABPI, established the Swedish Code in 1969. Since then, both
codes have been repeatedly revised and have evolved over time to incorporate principles set
out in recommendations by the European and international industry trade associations
[16,17], as well as in national and EU law [8]. In addition to setting standards for advertising,
the codes have rules governing, among other things, relationships with health professionals
and patient organizations. An important distinction is that the UK Code applies solely to pro-
motion of prescription drugs, with over-the-counter (OTC) drug promotion covered by a sepa-
rate code administered by the Proprietary Association of Great Britain (PAGB, the trade
association for manufacturers of OTC medicines and food supplements). By contrast, the
Swedish Code lays down standards for promotion of both prescription and OTC drugs, along
with veterinary drugs.
To enforce the codes, the ABPI and LIF have installed self-regulatory bodies that on a day-
to-day basis operate independently of the leadership of the respective associations (Fig. 1). In
1993 the ABPI established the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority (PMCPA) as
the quasi-autonomous body responsible for administering the UK Code. The PMCPA consists
of the Code of Practice Panel that deals with complaints under the code from whatever source,
and the Code of Practice Appeal Board that deals with appeals to the panel’s decisions. The
panel can also report any company to the Appeal Board whose conduct under the code is of
special concern.
In Sweden, since 1974 two self-regulatory bodies supervise company adherence to the code:
the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Information Examiner (IGM) and the Information Practices
Committee (NBL). The IGM is appointed to deal with complaints, a role analogous to the UK
Code of Practice Panel. However, unlike the Code of Practice Panel, the IGM does not address
complaints from public authorities such as the Swedish Medical Products Agency (MPA, the
national medicines regulatory authority). Instead, such complaints are sent directly to the NBL
committee, which, except in this respect, is functionally analogous to the UK Code of Practice
Appeal Board; its main role is to address appeals of IGM decisions.
Despite the significance of pharmaceutical industry self-regulation, this process has received
limited scrutiny, perhaps reflecting a US bias in the literature on drug promotion and its regu-
lation. The few existing empirical studies have nevertheless suggested that ethical standards are
usually weak, enforcement is ineffective, and sanctions are mild [18–21]. Admittedly, however,
the limited number of empirical studies in conjunction with the evolving nature of regulatory
systems militates against definitive conclusions. Moreover, differences among self-regulatory
schemes could make it problematic to extrapolate findings from one country to another [19].
The latter point underscores the need for international comparisons, which have been success-
fully carried out in other areas of pharmaceutical regulation [22]. Such comparisons could
serve as the basis for suggestions to reform regulatory arrangements in an effort to improve the
quality of medicines information in the interest of public health.
With that in mind, our purpose was 2-fold. First, we sought to compare self-regulation in
the two European countries in order to identify regulatory strengths and weaknesses. Second,
we sought to investigate discrepancies between the industry codes of conduct and the actual
practices of companies. For both purposes we investigated documents and case reports issued
by self-regulatory bodies in the UK and Sweden.
Pharmaceutical Industry Self-Regulation of Drug Promotion
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Fig 1. Self-regulatory schemes in the United Kingdom and Sweden. Both countries have a dual-structure self-regulatory system. Complaints emerge
from either industry or non-industry sources. In the former case, companies must first attempt to settle disagreements through inter-company dialogue. The
Code of Practice (CP) Panel in the UK (A) and the IGM in Sweden (B) impose economic sanctions on violating companies and also publicize rulings. In
addition, the IGMmay require a company to issue a corrective statement. The CP Appeal Board and the NBL deal with appeals. The CP Panel can also
report any company to the CP Appeal Board whose conduct under the Code is of special concern. The CP Appeal Board has a greater range of non-
economic disciplinary measures at its disposal than does the NBL. The respective industry trade group may discipline companies in extreme cases (not
shown). NGOs, non-governmental organizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785.g001
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Methods
Study Overview
This study investigates industry self-regulation and promotion of pharmaceuticals for human
use in the UK and Sweden. In a first step, we used a qualitative approach to outline similarities
and differences between systems regarding constitution and procedures. In a second step, we
collected data from both systems regarding various parameters, including registered com-
plaints, rulings, complainants, and specific clauses in the code cited in rulings of breach. These
data offer insights into the workings of self-regulatory systems, but also into the violative pro-
motional activities of companies. Much of the UK data are published in annual PMCPA re-
ports. One caveat is that data are currently only available for 2004–2012. We therefore
restricted our study to this interval. In a third step, we examined the sanctions imposed by self-
regulatory bodies on companies and used these figures to estimate the overall financial cost to
manufacturers associated with sanctions. In a fourth and final step, we used violations
highlighted as particularly serious by self-regulatory bodies to investigate the prevalence and
nature of violation rulings considered especially grave in each country. All quantitative data (e.
g., the number of complaints and rulings of breach, and clauses cited in rulings of breach) were
retrieved and coded independently by two authors (SM and AVZ). In cases of discrepancy be-
tween authors’ assessments, a consensus decision was reached following a joint retrieval and
coding of the data.
Qualitative Analysis of Self-Regulatory Systems
We conducted a systematic analysis of documents detailing the constitution and procedures
of self-regulation in the UK and Sweden. This includes the respective codes and associated doc-
uments outlining the workings of the systems, but also reports produced by self-regulatory
bodies on an annual, biannual, or quarterly basis, as well as individual case reports issued by
self-regulatory bodies (Table 1). This material is publicly available on the PMCPA and LIF web
sites. Relevant analytic categories were generated by one of the authors (SM) using qualitative
Table 1. Information from self-regulatory bodies in the UK and Sweden.
Reports United Kingdom Sweden
Case reports Individual reports of all cases subject to complaint are publicly
available on the PMCPA website. Cases searchable based on
words or phrases.
Individual reports of all cases subject to complaint are publicly
available on the LIF website. Cases searchable based on words,
phrases, company, ATC Code (at any level), brand name, and
clause.
Information in
case reports
Besides detailing the case, reports include a case number ID and
information on the complainant, respondent and the medicine(s)
(typically brand names) and the clauses and sub-clauses
breached or allegedly breached.
Besides detailing the case, reports include a case number ID
and information on the complainant, respondent and the
medicine(s) (typically brand and generic names and ATC codes)
and the clauses breached or allegedly breached
Case reports contain no explicit information on administrative
charges.
Case reports contain explicit information on administrative
charges
Case reports do not typically contain violating material. Case reports typically provide the violating material as PDF ﬁle
Case reports specify all claim(s) in breach of the code, but do not
indicate all publications or activities where these claims were
made prior to the ruling.
Case reports specify all claim(s) in breach of the code, but do
not indicate all publications or activities where these claims were
made prior to the ruling
Information in
summary reports
Quarterly reports with detailed reports of cases and a summary
of rulings
Biannual IGM reports with statistics on complaints and rulings
Annual reports with statistics on complaints, rulings, and
accounts
Annual NBL reports with limited statistics. No information on
accounts
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785.t001
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content analysis whereby a body of text under scrutiny is condensed into coding units repre-
senting various categories and sub-categories (S1 Text) [23].
Quantitative Analysis of Industry Self-Regulation
Complaints and rulings.We compiled longitudinal data on registered complaints and cases
ruled in breach. For the UK, we also gathered data on the individual matters found to be in
breach, since in the UK (though not in Sweden) each case is subdivided into multiple matters
for independent rulings. UK data were obtained directly from the PMCPA annual reports. For
Sweden, data pertaining to the IGM are available in a supplement to the biannual IGM reports,
which are available upon request from the LIF. Data pertaining to the NBL since 1991 are avail-
able on a yearly basis in annual reports. Unlike the UK Code, the Swedish Code also applies to
promotion of veterinary products. The IGM/NBL database is searchable using Anatomic Ther-
apeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system codes, and cases pertaining to veterinary prod-
ucts were identified through the ATC code (begins with Q) and excluded from the analysis.
Similarly, breaches subject to appeal were subtracted from the total if the appeal was successful.
Complainants. The PMCPA annual reports, the IGM supplement to the biannual reports,
and the NBL annual reports also contain information on the number of complaints by type of
complainant. In each case, data are presented numerically for specific complainant categories.
We employed the following categories that are used in both countries: industry, health profes-
sionals, Swedish MPA, or UKMedicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA,
the national medicines regulatory authority), other organizations or bodies (e.g., UK National
Institute of Clinical Excellence, Sweden’s Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency), active
monitoring by self-regulatory bodies of promotional material after dissemination (so-called
ex-post scrutiny), and others (e.g., anonymous, member of public, industry employee or ex-
employee). For the UK, we also included the category “other PMCPA Director.” These are
complaints nominally attributed to the PMCPA Director but not initiated following active
monitoring. Instead, such complaints have usually emerged either in response to media
criticism, from voluntary admissions by companies, or when there is an alleged breach of
undertaking.
Active monitoring by self-regulatory bodies. The number of cases taken up following ac-
tive monitoring in the UK is reported under a separate heading in the PMCPA annual reports.
In Sweden, the IGM is responsible for active monitoring. This work is detailed in a supplement
to the biannual IGM reports, which contains data on the number of scrutinized objects by type
(i.e., journal ads to health professionals, internet ads, ads to the public, mailings to health
professionals).
Pattern of code breaches. For each case in Sweden and each matter in the UK, self-regula-
tory bodies can issue rulings of breach of one or more clauses in the code. Because each case in
the UK may involve numerous matters (see above), the number of rulings of breach of specific
clauses is far higher in the UK. This difference is augmented by the fact that UK self-regulatory
body rulings specify sub-clauses (e.g., two breaches to §7.2; two breaches to §7.3), whereas
Swedish self-regulatory bodies typically specify only the breached clause (e.g., breach to §7).
UK information on breached clauses was collected on a case-by-case basis from quarterly
reports that include a summary of the outcomes for each case addressed by the PMCPA. For
Sweden, data pertaining to breaches of specific clauses identified by the IGM since 1998 are
available as supplements to the IGM biannual reports. Although information on breaches is
not summarized in the same way for NBL rulings, we compiled this information by reviewing
all such rulings in the database for 2004–2012 and recorded the specific clauses breached on a
case-by-case basis. We subtracted breaches subject to successful appeal or pertaining to
Pharmaceutical Industry Self-Regulation of Drug Promotion
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veterinary products (identified as above). Notably, both the UK and Swedish Code has under-
gone some changes since 2004. Our coding follows the 2012 version of the Codes.
Economic sanctions and cost calculations. Self-regulatory bodies may impose economic
sanctions on violating companies. Arguably, for economic sanctions to act as a deterrent they
cannot be negligible in proportion to industry revenues. We therefore analyzed the charges
paid by the industry both in absolute amounts (in EUR) and in relation to total revenues from
drug sales. Economic sanctions were defined as the charges imposed on companies by self-reg-
ulatory bodies and also, in the UK where this is applicable, as costs for audits and corrective
ads or public reprimands paid by violating companies. We estimated industry revenues using
annual sales of drugs at manufacturers’ prices, i.e., excluding pharmacy margins. For the UK,
we considered sales of prescription drugs, while for Sweden we considered sales of both OTC
and prescription drugs since the Swedish Code applies to both. UK sales data at manufacturers’
prices through 2011 were obtained from [24] and are based on a standard manufacturers’ dis-
count rate to wholesalers of 12.5%. We estimated the 2012 value by adding +1.5% to the 2011
value in accordance with available estimates of the increase in cost of medicines to the UK Na-
tional Health Service, the publically funded health care system, in 2012 [25]. Swedish sales data
on manufacturers’ prices are not available. However, we estimated this figure by applying a cor-
rection factor of −17.4% to total sales [26] in order to arrive at an estimate of pharmacy mar-
gins, as was suggested by personnel at the Swedish Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency
(personal communication, E. Ahlo to SM), which determines what therapeutic products and
devices will be state subsidized.
The PMCPA annual reports contain data on yearly economic sanctions imposed on violat-
ing companies. Swedish data are not similarly publicized. However, upon request, LIF person-
nel provided us with data from 2009 to 2012, but informed us that data prior to 2009 were
unavailable. For Sweden, we arrived at the totals used to calculate economic sanctions by sub-
tracting any charges for veterinary drug promotion for each year, as specified in case reports
identified according to the procedure described above. To convert SEK and GBP into EUR, re-
spectively, on an annual basis we used the average annual exchange rates available from the
Swedish Riksbank [27] and the Bank of England [28].
Non-economic sanctions. In addition to economic sanctions, self-regulatory bodies may
impose non-economic sanctions other than the standard publication of case reports, such as re-
quiring companies to issue corrective statements. UK data on non-economic sanctions were
collected on a case-by-case basis from quarterly reports. For Sweden, we did not encounter any
references to non-economic sanctions in the IGM biannual or NBL annual reports (other than
the publication of case reports). We therefore contacted the LIF, which provided us with the
relevant information.
Serious Violations of the Industry Codes
Both self-regulatory systems have ways to highlight what they consider to be particularly seri-
ous violations. In the UK, this is done by ruling of breach of §2 (promotion that “brings dis-
credit to, and reduction of confidence in, the industry”) and/or by imposing non-economic
sanctions other than the publication of a case report. The Swedish Code does not contain an
equivalent of the UK §2. However, because a differentiated rate has been applied in Sweden
since 2004 for simple, common and serious offences, with the highest rate category (SEK
100,000, approximately €11,200, or more) reserved for serious offences, it is nonetheless possi-
ble to identify rulings involving serious violations. The charge levied in each ruling is highlight-
ed in the IGM/NBL database and by chronologically browsing through the database we were
Pharmaceutical Industry Self-Regulation of Drug Promotion
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able to identify rulings of serious violations for each year. Again, we excluded cases subject to
successful appeal or pertaining to veterinary products.
We also investigated which clauses were cited in rulings and what companies, complainants,
and drugs were involved. We derived this information from each case report. Again we used
the 2012 version of the codes for our analysis. Regarding drugs, we coded data using ATC
codes. A few (n = 9) UK cases involved more than one §2 ruling and these were coded as multi-
ple violations. When compiling data on sanctioned companies we used the ABPI and LIF lists
of existing member and affiliate companies available on the websites of the respective organiza-
tions. In cases where a sanctioned company was not listed we checked whether that company
had merged with or been acquired by another company (e.g., Wyeth by Pfizer). In such cases
we assigned the breach to the existing company (i.e., Pfizer). In cases where the violation was
by a subsidiary company (e.g., McNeil) we assigned the breach to the parent company (i.e.,
Johnson & Johnson).
To further investigate illicit promotion, we focused on the therapeutic class associated with
the highest number of rulings of serious breaches in each country. We reasoned that this would
provide a reasonable number of cases for in-depth analysis without introducing a country bias.
Each case report was read, summarized, and then coded [23] according to type(s) of marketing
violation (e.g., misleading claim, off-label promotion) by one of the authors (SM) based on the
compiled summary. The summary and coding were checked for accuracy against the case re-
ports by another author (AVZ).
Data Processing and Analysis
We used descriptive analysis to explore trends in complaints, rulings of breach, and statutory
copies of promotional material submitted by companies to the IGM for active monitoring (in
the UK companies are not required to submit material, see below). We used the number of stat-
utory copies as an indicator of marketing activity in Sweden. Descriptive analysis was also used
to analyze other parameters, e.g., clauses in the code cited in rulings and complainants. Data
were analyzed using GraphPad Prism 6.0 (GraphPad software).
Results
Constitution and Procedures of Self-regulation in the UK and Sweden
Table 2 compares the UK and Sweden systems across some pertinent constitutional and proce-
dural characteristics. It is the industry trade groups that install the self-regulatory bodies. Thus
the ABPI appoints the Code of Practice Panel, which comprises a director, deputy director, sec-
retary, and deputy secretary, as well as the Appeal Board, which comprises a legally qualified
chairperson and 15 members. While eight members of the Appeal Board represent industry,
the remaining eight represent other interests: three medical practitioners, one pharmacist, and
one nurse prescriber—appointed following consultation with the British Medical Association,
Royal Pharmaceutical Society, and Royal College of Nursing, respectively—along with one pa-
tient advocate, one lay member, and one representative from an independent body providing
medicines information—all appointed following consultation with the MHRA.
The Swedish IGM is a scientifically qualified physician. As of 2013, two IGMs may be ap-
pointed by the LIF: one responsible for activities and material geared toward health profession-
als, the other for activities and material geared toward the public. The NBL committee consists
of a legally qualified chairperson and 11 members: six represent industry, three the general
public, and two are medical experts. The LIF appoints the entire committee; however, the rep-
resentatives of the general public and medical experts are appointed following consultation
Pharmaceutical Industry Self-Regulation of Drug Promotion
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with an appropriate body or authority representing consumers and the Swedish Medical
Association, respectively.
Notably, the rules of procedures specify that self-regulatory bodies in both countries should
not only consider lodged complaints, but also undertake routine active monitoring of promo-
tional items in relation to requirements stipulated by the Code. In Sweden, companies are
obliged to submit statutory copies of promotional print material, mailings, Internet ads, and
films to the IGM to facilitate monitoring. In the UK, however, companies are only obliged to
submit material upon request.
Another important procedural feature in both countries is that companies must first at-
tempt to settle disagreements through inter-company dialogue; the complainant company
should only lodge a complaint for arbitration if such efforts should be unsuccessful (Fig. 1). By
contrast, non-industry complainants directly lodge complaints with self-regulatory bodies. In
Sweden, an exception to the inter-company dialogue requirement may be permitted “if the
measure constitutes a serious disregard of good industrial practice or if a prompt intervention
is required to prevent further damage caused by the measure” (p. 69) [14]. In the UK, an excep-
tion is made “where the allegation is that a company has failed to comply with an undertaking
that it has given” in relation to a previous ruling (p. 44) [15].
As outlined in Fig. 1, the non-economic sanctions available to self-regulatory bodies differ
somewhat between these two countries. A shared feature, however, is that any economic
Table 2. Constitution and procedures of self-regulation in the UK and Sweden.
Constitution and
Procedures
United Kingdom Sweden
Scope of code Promotion of prescription drugs. Applies to members of the
ABPI. Non-ABPI members may agree to abide by the Code.
Promotion of prescription, OTC, and veterinary drugs. Applies
to members of LIF, and the trade groups for small life science
companies (IML) and generic manufacturers (FGL).
Bodies PMCPA: Panel and Board of Appeal. See text for details. IGM and NBL. See text for details.
Financing Administrative charges, levies from ABPI members and
seminar fees
Administrative charges and funds from LIF
Pre-vetting No IGM pre-vets vaccination programs and drug information on
company websites aimed at the public.
Active monitoring by
self-regulatory bodies
Yes. See text for details. Yes. See text for details.
If a company accepts a ruling of breach, and agrees to stop
dissemination of material, no charges will be applied and there
will be no case report.
If a case is of minor importance, and the company has
terminated the practice, or immediately rectiﬁes the matter,
the case may be dismissed and there will be no case report.
Sanctions See Fig. 1. See Fig. 1.
Public information
release
Announcements in professional literature including details of
cases where companies are ruled in breach of §2 (see text), or
are required to issue corrective statements or are the subject of
public reprimand.
No policy on advertising violations
Rules on complaints
procedure
Inter-company dialogue required Inter-company dialogue required
Anonymity of complaining individuals as a rule No anonymity of complainant as a rule
If a company voluntarily reports a possible breach, and is
subsequently ruled in breach, charges will be reduced by half.
No policy on voluntary admission of breach
Rule on cases pending
appeal
If the panel considers that the material or activity is likely to
prejudice public health and/or patient safety, and/or that it
represents a serious breach, it must decide whether use of the
material or activity should be suspended pending ﬁnal outcome
of the case.
Irrespective of whether an appeal has been lodged,
companies must comply with IGM requests until the NBL
decides otherwise.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785.t002
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sanctions imposed on companies are collected as a contribution to the self-regulatory system. In
cases of violation, the sanctioned company pays administrative charges; however, if a complaint
brought by one company against another company is ruled invalid, the complainant company
pays the administrative charge. Non-industry complainants are exempt from this rule. In the
UK, companies pay on the basis of the number of matters ruled upon; numerous matters may
arise in a particular case and each is considered independently. Currently, the administrative
charge per matter for an ABPI member that accepts the Panel’s ruling is about €3,600, and the
Fig 2. Flow diagram of selected complaints, cases, and violations in the United Kingdom (A) and Sweden (B) 2004–2012.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785.g002
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charge per unsuccessfully appealed matter is about €13,200. This differs from Sweden, where
each complaint is considered to be a single entity and where a differentiated rate has been applied
since 2004, currently about €4,500, €10,200, and €15,800 for simple, common, and serious of-
fences, respectively. Higher charges may be imposed for breaches of undertaking, with a ceiling
of about €52,500. There is also an extra charge of about €4,500 for unsuccessfully appealed cases.
Complaints and Rulings of Breach of Industry Codes 2004–2012
The study selection process is shown in Fig. 2. The numbers of complaints and cases ruled in
breach on a yearly basis were similar in both countries: median number of complaints in the
UK was 101 (range 78–134) and cases ruled in breach 69 (range 43–88), and in Sweden 110
(range 74–119) and 59 (range 47–73), respectively. The number of complaints and cases ruled
in breach appear to have decreased over the studied period in both countries (Fig. 3A and 3B).
The average annual decline in complaints in the UK was −5.1 (standard deviation [SD] = 16.7)
and in cases ruled in breach −5.0 (SD = 5.7), and in Sweden −5.6 (SD = 9.1) and −2.1 (SD = 7.5),
Fig 3. Complaints, rulings of breach, and complainants in the United Kingdom and Sweden 2004–2012. (A) and (B) show the number of registered
complaints and cases ruled in breach in the UK and Sweden, respectively (total registered complaints: n = 933 in UK, n = 916 Sweden; total cases ruled in
breach: n = 597 in UK, n = 536 in Sweden). (A) also shows matters in breach in the UK (n = 1368). (C) Statutory copies of drug promotion sent by companies
in Sweden to the IGM for scrutiny in 1998–2012 (n = 59,158). Dashed line indicates year 2004. (D) shows mosaic plot of registered complaints by type of
complainant in each country.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785.g003
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respectively. However, the number of individual matters in breach in the UK (not applicable in
Sweden) varied substantially, with no obvious decrease over time. In Sweden, the decrease in
complaints and violation rulings coincided with a drop in the number of statutory copies sub-
mitted by companies for scrutiny (from 4,693 in 2004 to 2,715 in 2012; average annual decline
−247 [SD = 247]) (Fig. 3C). From 2004 to 2012, violation rulings in Sweden decreased with
23% but statutory copies decreased with 41%. The decrease in statutory copies is largely ex-
plained by a more than 3-fold decrease in the number of journal advertisements aimed at
health professionals (from 1962 in 2004 to 598 in 2012; S1 Fig.).
Complainants
Fig. 3D shows the source of the complaints. Four findings are readily apparent from this figure.
First, the proportion of complaints from industry is similar in both countries: 26% (n = 243) in the
UK and 28% (n = 255) in Sweden. Second, the SwedishMPA regularly lodges complaints, while
the UKMHRA does not; indeed, the MHRA only lodged seven complaints (0.8% of total), but
there were 99MPA complaints (11%). Third, the number of cases initiated following complaints
from health professionals and other individuals is much larger in the UK (n = 370, 40% and n = 192,
21%, respectively) than in Sweden (n = 68, 7.4% and n = 34, 3.7%, respectively). Interestingly,
we found a number of anonymous and non-anonymous complaints in the UK from industry
employees/ex-employees (n = 22, 2.4% and n = 23, 2.4%, respectively), but none in Sweden.
Fourth, the IGM, unlike the PMCPA Director, regularly initiates cases following active
monitoring. As a result of this monitoring, the IGM initiated 430 cases (47% of total). By com-
parison, the PMCPA Director initiated two cases (0.2%) following active monitoring, one in
2004 and one in 2006. In addition, from 2006 to 2012 the PMCPA Director reported that 25 ad-
vertisements were under scrutiny for potential breach of the Code and that all cases were re-
solved administratively with the companies involved (no data were available for 2004 and
2005). Only one of these cases was addressed in 2009 and none between 2010 and 2012.
Pattern of Code Breaches
In the UK, there were 1950 rulings of breach of specific clauses over the study period (Table 3
for selected clauses; S1 Table for complete list). Over 50% (n = 1,021) pertained to §7, i.e., “in-
formation, claims and comparisons”; of those, over half (n = 558) concerned §7.2 mandating
that information, claims, and comparisons must be accurate, balanced, fair, objective, and un-
ambiguous, must reflect an up-to-date evaluation of all the evidence and must not mislead. No-
tably, 5.8% (n = 113) of rulings concerned pre-licensing promotion or promotion inconsistent
with the terms of the marketing authorization or the summary of product characteristics (SPC)
(§3), 4.9% (n = 96) concerned conduct of industry representatives (§15), 4.3% (n = 84) con-
cerned promotion of prescription drugs to the public (§22), and 3.7% (n = 73) concerned pro-
vision of items, goods, services, sponsorship, and hospitality to health professionals (§18–§19).
There were 102 (5.2%) §2 rulings—i.e., rulings reserved for particularly serious cases of mis-
conduct—and 38 (1.9%) breaches of undertaking (§25).
In Sweden, over the same period, there were 972 rulings of breach of specific clauses
(Table 4 for selected clauses; S2 Table for complete list). Just as for the UK, breaches regarding
information, claims, and comparisons were most common, either concerning marketing aimed
at health professionals (§4, 26%, n = 250), or at the public (§104, 7.5%, n = 73). In addition, 16%
(n = 158) concerned violations of §8 or §10–§12, mandating appropriate documentation and ref-
erences for claims, as well as fair comparisons. Moreover, as in the UK, a significant number of
breaches (§2; 16%, n = 156, and §102; 10%, n = 100) concerned promotion prior to or inconsis-
tent with the terms of the marketing authorization or the SPC, and 10% (n = 100) concerned
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promotion of prescription drugs to the public (§102). There were 54 breaches (5.6%) of §32–§42,
which lay down rules on provision of items, goods, services, sponsorship, and hospitality to
health professionals. The Swedish Code does not contain specific clauses on serious violations or
failures of undertaking, thereby impeding comparisons among such clauses.
Sanctions for Code Breaches
Fig. 4 shows the economic sanctions imposed on the industry both in absolute numbers and in
relation to estimated revenues from drug sales. In Sweden, between 2009 and 2012 (data only
available since 2009) charges corresponded to an average of €447,000 per year, or 0.014% of
Table 3. UK rulings of breach of selected clauses 2004–2012.
§ Description Abbreviated Speciﬁcation All Breaches
n = 1,950a
All Cases
n = 597b
Serious
Cases
n = 100c
2 Discredit and conﬁdence Promotion that “brings discredit to, and reduction of
conﬁdence in, the industry.”
102 (5.2%) 92 (15%) 92 (92%)
3 Marketing authorization Promotion prior to the grant of a marketing authorization
(§3.1; n = 27), or inconsistent with the terms of marketing
authorization and with the particulars listed in the SPC
(§3.2; n = 86).
113 (5.8%) 88 (15%) 20 (20%)
7 Information, claims, and comparisons E.g., any information, claim, or comparison must be
accurate, be an up-to-date evaluation of all the evidence,
and must not mislead (§7.2; n = 558); must be capable of
substantiation (§7.4; n = 193); Promotion must encourage
rational medicine use by presenting it objectively (§7.10;
n = 95).
1,021 (52%) 280 (47%) 28 (28%)
15 Representatives E.g., representatives must at all times maintain a high
standard of conduct and comply with all relevant
requirements of the code (§15.2; n = 54). Companies must
prepare detailed brieﬁng material for medical
representatives on the technical aspects of each medicine
which they promote. Material must not advocate, either
directly or indirectly, any course of action that would be
likely to lead to a breach (§15.9; n = 27).
96 (4.9%) 81 (14%) 15 (15%)
18 Items for patients; promotional aids;
goods and services; agreements to
beneﬁt patients
E.g., no gift, pecuniary advantage, or beneﬁt may be
supplied, offered, or promised to members of the health
professions or to administrative staff in connection with the
promotion of medicines or as an inducement to prescribe,
supply, administer, recommend, buy, or sell any medicine
(§18.1; n = 26).
37 (1.9%) 35 (5.9%) 15 (15%)
19 Meetings, hospitality, and sponsorship E.g., companies must not provide hospitality to members of
the health professions and administrative staff except in
association with scientiﬁc or promotional meetings,
congresses, and training (§19.1; n = 35).
36 (1.8%) 30 (5.0%) 17 (17%)
22 Relations with the public and the
media
E.g. prescription medicines must not be advertised to the
public (§22.1; n = 31); Information about prescription
medicines to the public must be factual and not raise
unfounded hopes or be misleading with respect to safety
(§22.2; n = 53).
84 (4.3%) 55 (9.2%) 13 (13%)
25 Compliance with undertakings When an undertaking has been given in relation to a ruling,
the company concerned must ensure that it complies with
that undertaking.
38 (1.9%) 33 (5.5%) 25 (25%)
aPercentages indicate cell portion of total breaches. E.g., 5.2% of breaches pertained to §2.
bPercentages indicate cell portion of total cases. E.g., 15% of cases involved one or more §2 ruling.
cPercentages indicate cell portion of total serious violation cases. E.g., 92% of serious violation cases involved one or more §2 ruling.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785.t003
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estimated annual revenues. In the UK, sanctions between 2004 and 2012 and between 2009
and 2012 corresponded to an average of €701,000 and €765,000 annually, or 0.0046% and
0.0051% of estimated annual revenues, respectively.
There were no examples of non-economic sanctions in Sweden other than the standard
publication of case reports. In the UK, there were 92 cases with one or more §2 ruling for a
total of 102 §2 rulings (Table 3), i.e., violations highlighted as particularly serious by self-regu-
latory bodies, and which are always publicized in the form of advertisements appearing in the
professional press. In addition, 19 §2 rulings were associated with one or more of the following
non-economic sanctions: audit of the company (n = 14), public reprimand (n = 9), corrective
statement (n = 2), recovery of promotional items (n = 1), or cash payment (n = 1), or
Table 4. Sweden rulings of breach of selected clauses 2004–2012.
§ Description Abbreviated Speciﬁcation All Breaches
n = 972a
All Cases
n = 536b
Serious
Cases
n = 101c
2 Marketing authorization The SPC constitutes the factual basis for information. Information
may only refer to drugs that have received marketing approval.
156 (16%) 156 (29%) 50 (49%)
4 Information, claims, and
comparisons
Information must be truthful and may not contain any presentation
that directly or indirectly is intended to mislead. E.g., exaggerated
claims about properties or effects may not be made (§4.3).
250 (26%) 250 (47%) 67 (66%)
8 Documentation and references Information as to the quality and efﬁcacy of a drug shall be capable
of substantiation by means of documentation of a high scientiﬁc
standard.
14 (1.4%) 14 (2.6%) 4 (4.0%)
10 Documentation and references Information that contains quotations, data, etc., from a scientiﬁc
study or deals with a comparison between drugs based on such a
study, must clearly contain information about relevant sources and
references.
18 (1.9%) 18 (3.4%) 4 (4.0%)
11 Documentation and references E.g., a study may not be cited in such a way that it could convey
an incorrect or misleading impression of its nature, scope,
implementation, or importance (§11.2); Statements of comparisons
should be expressed in such a way as to make clearly evident their
statistical validity (§11.4).
62 (6.4%) 62 (12%) 22 (22%)
12 Comparisons Comparisons between effects, active ingredients, costs of
treatment, etc., must be presented in such a way that the
comparison as a whole is fair.
64 (6.6%) 64 (12%) 22 (22%)
102 Marketing to the public:
marketing authorization
Information to the public on prescription drugs shall be supplied
only to the extent permitted in the MPA’s provisions and that which
applies according to laws and regulations. Information shall be
consistent with the SPC: see §2.
100 (10%) 100 (19%) 18 (18%)
104 Marketing to the public:
information, claims,
comparisons
Information or claim must be truthful and may not contain any
presentation in words or pictures that directly or indirectly is
intended to mislead. See §4.
73 (7.5%) 73 (14%) 14 (14%)
32–
42
Agreement on relations with
health care sector
E.g., rules on provision of items, goods, services, sponsorship, and
hospitality; Sponsorship of activities/conferences within the
operations of the public health care or pharmacy companies may
not take place (§38); No gifts or ﬁnancial beneﬁts may be supplied,
offered, or promised to personnel/pharmacy as an incentive to
recommend, prescribe, purchase, supply, sell, or administer drugs
(§40).
54 (5.6%) 54 (10%) 0
aPercentages indicate cell portion of total breaches. E.g., 16% of breaches pertained to §2.
bPercentages indicate cell portion of total cases. E.g., 29% of cases involved one or more §2 ruling.
cPercentages indicate cell portion of total serious violation cases. E.g., 49% of serious violation cases involved one or more §2 ruling.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785.t004
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temporary suspension from the ABPI (n = 3). Eight rulings did not involve breach of §2, but
were associated with one or more of the following: audit of the company (n = 6), public repri-
mand (n = 2), or recovery of promotional items (n = 3). In summary, 110 non-economic sanc-
tions (other than publication) were levied in the UK.
Serious Violations of Industry Code
In the UK, 100 cases (17% of total) for a total of 110 rulings were thus considered particularly
serious by self-regulatory bodies (Table 3; see also Fig. 2). In Sweden the figure was 101 cases
(19% of total) (Table 4). There were numerically fewer serious violation rulings in the UK and
Sweden in more recent years (Fig. 5A). In Sweden, 44% (n = 44) of serious violation cases were
initiated following active monitoring (Fig. 5B). In the UK, 40% (n = 44) of successful com-
plaints were nominally attributed to the PMCPA Director, but none of these resulted from ac-
tive monitoring. Only 3.9% (n = 4) of cases in Sweden resulted from complaints by health
professionals and none from complaints by other individuals, while in the UK the figures were
20% (n = 22) and 19% (n = 21), respectively (Fig. 5B). Also consistent with differences between
the countries we found that, while numerous UK cases pertained to misconduct of representa-
tives (§15) and/or provision of items, goods, services, sponsorship, and hospitality to health
professionals (§18), no serious violation rulings in Sweden cited a breach of §32–§42 covering
Fig 4. Charges levied on companies by self-regulatory bodies in the United Kingdom and Sweden
2004–2012.Charges in absolute amounts (A) and as percentage of estimated sales at manufacturers’ prices
(B) for prescription medicines in the UK and prescription and OTCmedicines in Sweden, respectively. Data
for Sweden available since 2009.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785.g004
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comparable activities (Tables 3–4 for selected clauses; S1–S2 Tables for complete list). Instead,
Swedish cases most frequently focused on violation of clauses mandating non-misleading in-
formation, claims, and comparisons (i.e., §4, §8, §10–§12, §104).
Forty-six companies were ruled in breach for a serious offence at least once in both coun-
tries combined (n = 36 in the UK; n = 27 in Sweden), and seven companies were ruled in
breach for a serious offence more than ten times: Pfizer (n = 19; 9.0%), Bayer (n = 16; 7.6%),
GlaxoSmithKline (n = 13; 6.1%), Novo Nordisk (n = 12; 5.7%), Novartis (n = 12; 5.7%), Astra-
Zeneca (n = 11; 5.2%), and Eli Lilly (n = 11; 5.2%) (S3 Table). In 2012, four of these companies
ranked among the ten largest in terms of global drug sales, and all ranked among the 17 largest
[29].
The drug class associated with the highest number of rulings for serious violations in each
country were diabetes drugs (UK, n = 15; Sweden, n = 6; 10% of serious violations) and urolo-
gics (Sweden, n = 13; UK, n = 6; 9%) (S4 Table; see also Fig. 2). A description of each case can
be found in S5–S8 Tables. As summarized in Table 5, these 40 rulings revealed one or more vi-
olating activities of various types, including—but not limited to—misleading claims (n = 23;
58%), failures to comply with undertakings (n = 9; 23%), pre-licensing (n = 7; 18%) or off-label
promotion (n = 2; 5%), and promotion of prescription drugs to the public (n = 6; 15%).
Discussion
Frequent and Serious Violations of the Industry Code of Conduct
Our study reveals a substantial number of violations of the two industry codes. Between 2004
and 2012, self-regulatory bodies in Sweden and the UK ruled a total of 536 and 597 cases to be
in breach, respectively, which translates to an average of more than one case per week in each
country. The Swedish MPA, writing in one of its regular information letters [30], reported sim-
ilar numbers over a decade ago: “Overall, the number of marketing activities ruled in breach
by the NBL and LIF Information Examiner (IGM) amount to some fifty/year, which is about
one/week. This is remarkable, given that the drug industry has authorized its own regulatory
system, and shows that a critical stance should always be taken regarding pharmaceutical in-
dustry marketing practices.”
Nonetheless, data from self-regulatory bodies show fewer complaints and cases ruled in
breach over the studied period. However, this is not true for individual matters in breach in the
Fig 5. Serious violations in the United Kingdom and Sweden 2004–2012: rulings of breach and complainants. (A) Serious violation rulings per year in
the UK (total n = 110) and Sweden (total n = 101). (B) shows mosaic plot of the source of the complaint for serious violation rulings in each country over the
entire period. A few cases had multiple complainants.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785.g005
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UK, obscuring any simple interpretation of trends. Moreover, there may be numerous reasons
for downward trends; for instance, while they may reflect increased compliance, they may also
be due to a lower tendency to report breaches. Yet another hypothesis is that the decline reflects
a reduction in the total number of marketing campaigns and/or changes in the type of promo-
tion. Consistent with the latter hypothesis, data from Sweden show a 41% decrease in submit-
ted statutory copies over the study period compared to a 23% decrease in violation rulings. US
data showing a decline in promotional spending since 2004 also support this hypothesis
[31,32]. However, the hypothesis of declining and/or changing marketing activity awaits statis-
tical testing, which requires larger sample sizes.
At this juncture, it is important to point out that for reasons outlined below, the numbers re-
ported herein likely underestimate the unethical conduct of companies. First, UK data do not
include activities pertaining to the promotion of OTC drugs. Second, it is implausible that
every violation is brought to the attention of self-regulatory bodies [20]. In particular, Code
breaches by industry representatives may be among the hardest to document, but also poten-
tially the most serious [33,34]. Third, it may be difficult to retrospectively demonstrate improp-
er conduct, for example to confirm that an industry representative actually said what the
complainant alleged. Fourth, there may be lax oversight from self-regulatory bodies, as was
suggested in a previous study [20]. Fifth, a number of complaints never progress to become
Table 5. Type and frequency of serious violation rulings: diabetes drugs and urologics.
Type of Violation UK
n = 21
SWE
n = 19
Example
Misleading claim 8 (38%) 15 (79%) Advertisement claimed: “There are no long-term cardio-vascular concerns regarding the use of Actos”
(pioglitazone; Takeda). Failed to mention that drug might exacerbate and precipitate heart failure and was
contraindicated in patients with, or with a history of, heart failure. (UK 2125/5/08a)
Breach of
undertaking
3 (14%) 6 (32%) Bayer marketed Levitra (vardenaﬁl) with claims of rapid onset inconsistent with the SPC despite three
successive rulings on this matter. (SWE W950/07; W955/07)
Pre-licensing
promotion
6 (29%) 1 (5.3%) Four §2 rulings regarding pre-licensing promotion of Victoza (liraglutide; Novo Nordisk): on website; via
sponsored meetings disguised as scientiﬁc and medical meetings; via paid-for insert in medical journal
disguised as independent supplement; at diabetes meeting by professor who failed to disclose ﬁnancial
relationship with company. (UK 2234/5/09)
Promotion to the
public
5 (24%) 1 (5.3%) Novo Nordisk promoted Victoza in a newspaper supplement (The Times) on World Diabetes day and,
further, did so prior to the granting of marketing authorization. (UK 2202/1/09)
Hospitality 3 (14%) 0 Bayer invited health professionals to a one and a quarter hours meeting on “The medical and surgical
management of erectile dysfunction” followed by a champagne reception and gourmet dinner. Hospitality
considered “excessive”. (UK 1741/7/05)
Disguised promotion 3 (14%) 0 Article in Future Prescriber constituted disguised and pre-licensing promotion of linagliptin by Boehringer-
Ingelheim. The article incorrectly claimed that the drug had received marketing authorization, and that it
was “safer to use” together with some medications than saxagliptin despite the lack of head-to-head
trials. (UK 2424/8/11; 2425/8/11)
Conduct of
representative
2 (9.5%) 0 Without apparent company approval, a representative implied that continued funding of an educational
post within the local diabetes network could be in danger if the hospital did not increase its use of Lilly
insulins. (UK 2044/9/07)
Off-label promotion 1 (4.8%) 1 (5.3%) Claim in mailing and advertisements, that Glucobay (acarbose, Bayer) had “cardioprotective effect” on
patients with IGT and type 2 diabetes constituted off-label promotion since the drug was approved neither
for patients with IGT nor for any cardioprotective use. (SWE W647/04; W648/04)
Rules on information 0 1 (5.3%) Astellas sent letter entitled “Important information for people who work in health care” to doctors. The
label “Important information” is only allowed for new information on ADRs, contraindications, restrictions,
or withdrawals. The letter contained no such information, but instead promoted Vesicare (solifenacine).
The MPA alleged disguised promotion, but the NBL rejected the allegation on this point. (SWE 913/11)
aCase number ID: see S5–S8 Tables for additional information.
ADR, adverse drug reaction; IGT, impaired glucose tolerance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785.t005
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established cases, either because the offence is considered minor and/or because the company
promises to immediately rectify the misdemeanor. Sixth, inter-company dialogue allows com-
panies to stop engaging in violative activities without being reprimanded by self-regulatory
bodies (which also means that no case report will exist and that activities most likely remain
publically unknown). Seventh, if the Codes are weak it may be possible for companies to be in
perfect compliance but still disseminate misleading information, as was pointed out previously
[35]. Eight, some cases of illicit promotion are handled by national medicines regulatory bod-
ies, rather than by self-regulatory bodies.
This latter point may be particularly relevant in the UK. Both the MPA and the MHRA say
they routinely scrutinize promotional material for potential breaches of advertising legislation,
and will also consider complaints from all sources, although both strongly encourage the use of
the self-regulatory system for complaints involving companies that have ratified the industry
Code [11,36]. However, whereas the MPA has delegated responsibility to self-regulatory bodies
to the extent that the MPA will itself submit complaints to the NBL, and will typically respect
decisions even if they are contrary to the agency’s own view (see the Vesicare example in
Table 5), the MHRA at least seems to retain a few more functions by comparison. Thus the
MRHA only submits cases to the PMCPA in situations where an initial investigation has found
no breach of legislation, but a potential breach of the industry Code [36]. On the other hand,
the MHRA will routinely decline to investigate potential breaches of advertising legislation that
are under investigation by the PMCPA for potential code breaches, in this way delegating the
responsibility to the self-regulatory system [36]. Still, each year a number of potential breaches
of advertising legislation are investigated by the MHRA. Some of these involve companies that
have ratified the industry Code [37].
This study also reveals that self-regulatory bodies also considered about 20% of cases ruled
in breach to be particularly serious, equating to an average of about one case per month in each
country. In both countries, there were numerically fewer rulings of serious violations towards
the end of the studied period. However, we note that the number of serious violation rulings in-
creased again in 2013 compared to 2012—in Sweden from one to nine; in the UK from eight to
15—suggesting a need to analyze longer time series. As shown by our analysis of cases involv-
ing promotion of diabetes drugs or urologics, such serious violations reveal conduct that may
compromise patient safety either directly by biasing prescribing practices (e.g., misleading
claims [38]), or indirectly by undermining the regulatory system for drug marketing approvals
(e.g., pre-licensing and off-label promotion [39]). Importantly, serious violations are not re-
stricted to just a few products or companies. Thus between 2004 and 2012, 46 existing compa-
nies were ruled in breach for a serious offence at least once in the UK and Sweden combined,
and many were repeat offenders including some of the largest pharmaceutical companies in
the world. The prevalence and severity of breaches testifies to a discrepancy between the ethical
standard approved by companies and codified in industry codes of conduct and the actual con-
duct of the industry.
Patterns in Industry Deviance
Self-regulatory bodies in Sweden and the UK ruled a total of 972 and 1,950 breaches to individ-
ual clauses, respectively, which translates into an average of almost two (Sweden) and more
than four (UK) per week. Note, however, that a head-to-head comparison between the two
countries is not possible because in the UK, but not in Sweden, each case is subdivided into
multiple matters that are ruled upon independently, which compounds the number of
breaches. By far, the most common reported violation in both countries relates to misleading
product information, claims, or comparisons, which is not surprising given that a number of
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studies investigating the quality of claims made in medical journal advertisements have reached
the conclusion that such claims are often misleading [9,20,40–47].
In light of the silence in Europe compared with the US concerning off-label promotion, it is
perhaps more surprising that numerous breaches in both study countries concerned pre-licens-
ing promotion or promotion inconsistent with the terms of the marketing authorization or
SPC. In the UK, for instance, such promotion accounted for 5.8% of breaches, while 20% of rul-
ings of serious violation cited the corresponding article (i.e., §3). However, even after excluding
cases of pre-licensing promotion, accounting for about one-third of violations judging from
the UK data where such a distinction is made, it cannot be assumed that the remaining viola-
tions represent cases of off-label promotion. The reason is that the SPC includes additional in-
formation aside from the authorized uses of the drug, such as clinical trial data and
pharmacological properties. Nevertheless, our qualitative analysis of promotion of diabetes
drugs and urologics did reveal examples of off-label promotion in both countries (see also
[48]).
Another notable piece of information is that 4.3% of breaches in the UK and 10% of
breaches in Sweden apparently concerned promotion of prescription drugs to the public. This
type of promotion is in conflict not only with EU law [49], but also with the current position of
the European industry trade group, which is that it does “not advocate U.S.-style direct-to-con-
sumer advertising as an appropriate model for Europe” (p. 822) [50]. This situation again
points to a discrepancy between the official discourse of the industry and actual practice.
Thus far this discussion has highlighted patterns of industry deviance shared by Sweden
and the UK. However, the pattern of Code breaches for particularly serious cases also
highlighted discrepancies, for example in regard to the conduct of representatives and the pro-
vision of items, goods, services, sponsorship, and hospitality to health professionals. It remains to
be determined whether such discrepancies are due to differences in industry marketing strategies
between the countries, or if they (also) reflect cross-country differences that impact the tendency
of actors to report breaches, such as demographic (population size differences, currently 63.7 mil-
lion versus 9.6 million, or differences in the number of health professionals), cultural (e.g., trust
in regulators or industry), or procedural differences (e.g., names of complainants are kept confi-
dential in the UK). Interestingly, in support of the latter explanation, we found a number of com-
plaints from industry employees and ex-employees in the UK, but not in Sweden.
Creating Incentives for Industry
We interpret the arguably high rate of code violations as evidence that self-regulation has failed
to sufficiently deter industry from engaging in frequent and sometimes serious unethical prac-
tices, as judged by the industry’s own standards. The lack of sufficient deterrent effect is also
supported by our findings that many companies were repeat offenders and that companies on
numerous occasions ignored rulings as evidenced by subsequent rulings of failures to comply
with undertakings (see Levitra example in Table 5 for a particularly illustrative case). One rea-
son for this high rate could be that costs for violations are too low. Consistent with this, we
found that charges incurred amounted to an average of about 0.014% and 0.005% of estimated
yearly revenues from drug sales in Sweden and the UK, respectively. To put this into context,
consider that industry promotion in the US in 2010 was estimated at 9% of sales revenue [31],
though the real figure is likely to be significantly higher [51], with the WHO citing a figure of
about 30% globally [52]. Notably, the charges incurred on violating companies in the UK and
Sweden are considerably below the level experienced by the industry in the US. Thus from Jan-
uary 2009 through September 2012 the US Department of Justice recovered nearly US$10.5 bil-
lion in whistleblower suits under the False Claims Act [53], corresponding to 0.8% of total US
Pharmaceutical Industry Self-Regulation of Drug Promotion
PLOSMedicine | DOI:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785 February 17, 2015 19 / 28
prescription drug sales 2009–2012 [54]. Some have argued that the US penalties threaten to
cripple the industry financially [55]. Others have maintained that even the US fines are too low
as evidenced by the lack of long-term impact on company stock prices and the profitable na-
ture of illicit activities [56, 57].
In fairness, charges in the UK and Sweden are not designed to damage corporations finan-
cially; presently, they reflect the cost of administering the self-regulatory system—hence the
term “administrative charges” used in the UK. In fact, because charges in the UK are not even
sufficient to cover the costs of managing the self-regulatory system, including rent to the ABPI,
corporations also pay an annual levy, in 2012 about €2,200–€17,400 depending on the size of
the company [58]. In Sweden, LIF may similarly inject extra capital to cover expenses, but the
amounts remain undisclosed. Arguably, the fact that infringing corporations pay charges
aimed at keeping the self-regulatory system afloat, rather than providing compensation for
damages caused by—and profits generated as a result of—illicit promotion represents a major
weakness in both systems.
Ultimately however, economic penalties may not be enough to deter companies from illicit
promotion [3]. Tarnishing the reputation of violating companies might be equally important,
if this has major negative effect on business performance. According to the PMCPA, “Publicity
is the main sanction when breaches of the Code are ruled” [59] and as a matter of policy, when
a breach of §2 is ruled, a public reprimand is issued. From this perspective a major weakness of
the Swedish system is the lack of an equivalent to the UK §2 and a policy to publicly reprimand
companies. As a matter of fact, despite a provision that allows the IGM and NBL to require
companies to issue corrective statements, evidently this has never happened in Sweden, despite
frequent and serious violations of the Code.
Active Monitoring and Pre-vetting: Important Regulatory Instruments
One of the most remarkable findings of this study is that despite the fact that active monitoring
is supposedly a major function of the PMCPA under the Code, and despite a memorandum in-
volving the ABPI, PMCPA, and MHRA that since 2005 tasks the PMCPA with routine scrutiny
of promotional material [36], there is little prima facie evidence that the authority fulfills its du-
ties in this respect to any significant extent. This finding is particularly problematic in light of
data from Sweden suggesting that active monitoring is an important mechanism for exposing
violations, including particularly serious ones. A key feature of the Swedish system is that com-
panies are required to submit statutory copies of drug promotion. Although limited to print
material, mailings, Internet ads, and films, this requirement may nonetheless facilitate identifi-
cation of material in breach.
The fact that active monitoring seems viable in Sweden points to another issue worth pon-
dering: if the IGM is able to scrutinize material after publication, there is no apparent reason
why it could not vet material beforehand, were it to acquire additional resources. Notably, the
IGM already pre-vets vaccination programs and drug information on company websites aimed
at the public. The PMCPA, by contrast, does not pre-vet material, but the Proprietary Associa-
tion of Great Britain (PAGB) pre-vets consumer advertisements for OTC drugs [60]. More-
over, the MHRA has pre-vetted advertisements for new products, products affected by safety
concerns, or major new indications since 2005 after the House of Commons Select Committee
issued a recommendation in its landmark report on the undue influence of the industry [61].
The Swedish MPA, by contrast, does not pre-vet material, which would likely be in conflict
with the prohibition of censorship in the Swedish constitution.
However, despite assurances from the MHRA that “the vetting procedure is successful in
improving standards of advertising” (p. 14) [60], the UK medicines authority recently
Pharmaceutical Industry Self-Regulation of Drug Promotion
PLOSMedicine | DOI:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001785 February 17, 2015 20 / 28
announced that it was preparing to relax vetting efforts [12]. According to the MHRA’s seventh
annual report on advertising [60], publicity materials for 40 products were vetted in 2012, but
from now on, instead of assessing many advertising pieces, the MHRA announced it would be
looking at “perhaps a small number of key pieces, and that would be done in a very light touch
way” [12]. Yet, rather than supporting a light touch approach to vetting, the abundance of mis-
leading claims despite pre-vetting efforts would seem to mandate an intensified effort instead.
Policy Recommendations
As argued here, reforms that may improve the quality of medicines information include inten-
sified pre-vetting and active monitoring efforts in conjunction with fines that effectively deter
industry from illicit promotion, as well as greater publicity following rulings. This list is not ex-
haustive (for example, see [62] for additional suggestions). Such reforms could have relevance
for other countries as well [19] although more analyses of promotion regulatory systems are
needed to substantiate this contention. Tables 1 and 2 present additional features of regulatory
systems worth considering in future analyses, such as the extent of financial disclosure, rules re-
garding the complaints procedure, and type of information made available for public scrutiny.
Yet, despite the importance of improving current regulatory arrangements in an effort to
ensure unbiased medicines information, such initiatives alone are insufficient to achieve this
goal. The reason relates to the additional layers of industry bias that cannot be addressed by
simply improving oversight and increasing penalties, such as practices related to selection, de-
sign, and publication of clinical studies [63–67]. From this perspective, one attractive model to
counterbalance the influence of industry was implemented by the Italian medicines authorities,
requiring companies to contribute 5% of yearly expenditures devoted to promotional initiatives
aimed at physicians to a fund for independent clinical research [68]. The cost of pharmaceuti-
cals throughout the EU reached more than €218 billion in 2010 [69]. After correcting for phar-
macies’margins (−17.4% of expenses using to the Swedish example), and assuming that
industry spends 10%–30% (see above) of revenues on marketing, this would translate into
€0.9–€2.7 billion in tax revenues in the EU. To put this into perspective, the entire 2013 supra-
national EU budget for research and innovation amounted to €10.8 billion.
Another policy innovation worth considering is the creation of industry-independent orga-
nizations in each country dedicated to offering information on treatments, the funding for
which would be collected as a fixed percentage of charges levied by regulatory bodies. Crucially,
because the budget for this organization would be proportional to rule breaking by industry
(assuming discovery), this financial arrangement would not only have the advantage of incen-
tivizing industry to follow the rules, but would also incentivize the industry-independent orga-
nizations to act as a watchdog against violative industry conduct.
Limitation
This study has several limitations. First, although the UK and Swedish systems share a number
of relevant features facilitating direct comparison, including procedural similarities, there are
important differences that compound the analysis, including differences in market size and the
fact that the Swedish but not UK data include breaches pertaining to promotion of OTC medi-
cines. Second, calculations were based on data provided by self-regulatory bodies with no pos-
sibility to independently check for accuracy. Third, as noted above, the numbers presented
herein most likely underestimate the unethical conduct of the industry. Fourth, we did not as-
sess the frequency of violative versus non-violative conduct. For these reasons, the debate will
surely continue with critics of industry promotion contending that the cases identified are
merely the “tip of the iceberg” of misconduct, while defenders of industry promotion will
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contend that the critique suffers from the “denominator neglect” discussed by Stossel and Stell
[55] in relation to alleged dangers of industry bias in academia—that the many cases of proper
conduct dwarf the comparatively few cases that populate the numerator. Yet, as this study has
shown, the numerator of industry misconduct is anything but negligible.
Conclusion
The prevalence and severity of breaches identified by self-regulatory bodies in the UK and Swe-
den testifies to a discrepancy between the ethical standard codified in industry codes of conduct
and the actual conduct of the industry. Policies that might improve the quality of medicines in-
formation include intensified pre-vetting and active monitoring efforts in conjunction with
larger fines, as well as greater publicity following rulings. Future studies need to assess the effec-
tiveness of such policies and investigate promotion and its regulation in other countries.
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Editors' Summary
Background
Making and selling medicines is big business. In 2013, the global revenue of pharmaceuti-
cal companies was nearly US$1 trillion. And every year, a large proportion of this revenue
—maybe as much as one-third—is spent on drug promotion. The pharmaceutical compa-
nies claim that drug promotion (for example, advertisements in journals and visits from
pharmaceutical sales representatives) helps to inform and educate health care profession-
als about the risks and benefits of medicines. However, drug promotion also has the poten-
tial to encourage health care professionals to prescribe inappropriate or needlessly
expensive drugs and to encourage the public to buy unnecessary over-the-counter (OTC)
drugs (medicines that, unlike prescription drugs, can be bought without a written instruc-
tion from a physician or other licensed health care professional). In many countries, in-
cluding the US, government bodies regulate the promotion of medicines but in other
countries, including many in Europe, the pharmaceutical industry self-regulates medicines
promotion through voluntary codes of practice.
WhyWas This Study Done?
Over the past decade, several whistleblower cases have spotlighted the illicit marketing prac-
tices of pharmaceutical companies in the US but relatively few similar cases have been
brought in Europe. The reason for this discrepancy is unclear but one possibility is that the
wider use of self-regulation in Europe encourages the industry to comply with drug promo-
tion rules and deters illicit conduct. To date, however, self-regulation of medicines promo-
tion has been poorly studied. Here, the researchers undertake a quantitative (numerical) and
qualitative (descriptive) study of pharmaceutical self-regulation in the UK and Sweden, two
countries often cited as places where self-regulation is effective. In both countries, the rules
on medicines promotion are codified in the Code of Practice of the national industry trade
group and are overseen by self-regulatory bodies that operate independently of the trade
groups; the Swedish code applies to the promotion of both prescription and OTC drugs
whereas the UK code applies only to the promotion of prescription drugs.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find?
The researchers first undertook a qualitative content analysis of the documents outlining the
rules and procedures governing the self-regulatory bodies overseeing medicines promotion
in the two countries. Both bodies, they report, are required to actively monitor promotional
items and to impose sanctions on companies that violate the rules. However, a wider range
of sanctions, which includes the audit and public reprimand of offending companies in addi-
tion to economic sanctions, can be imposed in the UK than in Sweden. Analysis of numeri-
cal data collected by the self-regulatory bodies on complaints, complainants, and rulings
revealed that between 2004 and 2012 the Swedish and UK bodies ruled that 536 and 597
cases, respectively, were in breach of the country’s rules on medicines promotion; many of
the violations in both countries concerned misleading claims about a drug’s effects. In Swe-
den, nearly half the complaints resulted from active monitoring of promotional items com-
pared to only 0.2% in the UK. Charges incurred by companies because of violations of the
medicines promotion code were equivalent to about 0.014% and 0.0051% of annual sales
revenue in Sweden and the UK, respectively. Notably, nearly 20% of the cases in breach of
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the code of practice in both countries were serious breaches, and seven companies were in
serious violation more than ten times each in the two countries combined.
What Do These Findings Mean?
These findings indicate that, between 2004 and 2012, there were numerous violations of
the pharmaceutical industry codes regulating medicines promotion in both the UK and
Sweden. That is, there was a clear discrepancy between the ethical standard codified in the
pharmaceutical industry Codes of Practice in these two countries and the actual conduct
of the industry. Importantly, the discrepancy may be larger than reported here because the
researchers only considered violations that were detected and punished by the self-regula-
tory bodies in their analysis; some violations that occurred during the study period proba-
bly went undetected or unpunished. Given their findings, the researchers suggest that
regulatory reforms, including pre-vetting of promotional materials, intensified active
monitoring of promotion, larger fines, and the introduction of other sanctions such as
greater publicity following rulings, may help to improve the quality of medicines informa-
tion for health care professionals and the public in Sweden, the UK, and other countries
where the pharmaceutical industry self-regulates drug promotion.
Additional Information
Please access these websites via the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001785.
• Wikipedia provides information on pharmaceutical marketing (mainly in the US) (note
that Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia that anyone can edit; available in several
languages)
• The US Food and Drug Administration Office of Prescription Drug Promotion aims to
protect the public health by assuring prescription drug information is truthful, balanced,
and accurately communicated; the FDA’s Bad Ad Program aims to educate health care
professionals about the role they can play in ensuring that drug advertising and promo-
tion is truthful and not misleading
• Information on the UK regulatory framework is available from the UKMedicines and
Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA); the MHRA website also includes in-
formation on MHRA vetting of advertising material.
• Information on the UK self-regulatory body, the Prescription Medicines Code of
Practice Authority (PMCPA), is available; the PMCPA website includes information
about the UK Code of Practice for medicines promotion
• Details of the Swedish Code are also available; codes for other European countries are
provided by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations
• Healthy Skepticism is an international non-profit membership association that aims to
improve health by reducing harm from misleading health information
• TheWorld Health Organization provides information about drug promotion and atti-
tudes to it in “Drug Promotion—What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn—
Reviews of Materials in the WHO/HAI Database on Drug Promotion”
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